THE NEW REALISM COOPERATIVE STUDIES IN PHILOSOPHY by EDWIN B. HOLT WALTER. Originally published in 1911. PREFACE: ON July 21, 1910, we published a brief article entitled The Program and First Platform of Six Kealists l in which we indicated the direction philosophical inquiry ought to take. We there asserted that advance would be facilitated by cooperative investigations and the drafting of the platform was a first attempt to confirm this belief. The present volume continues, on a larger scale, the work there inaugurated and we hope it will be followed by other col lections of studies. The introductory essay voices our common opinions. The other essays do so only in part. It has seemed best to publish them with out laboring for complete unanimity, inasmuch as their agreements quite overshadow their differences. They have been written after prolonged conferences. A few important debatable topics are briefly discussed by dissenting members in the Appendix. DECEMBER 31, 1911.Contents include: INTRODUCTION SECTION PAG L THE HISTORICAL SIGNIFICANCE OP THE NEW REALISM ... 2 1. Naive realism, 2 2. Dualism, 4 3. Subjectivism of the Berkeleian type, 6 4. Subjectivism of the Kantian type, 8 6. The new realism, 9. II. THE REALISTIC POLEMIC 11 1. The fallacy of argument from the ego-centric predicament, 11 2. The fallacy of pseudo-simplicity, 12 3. The fallacy of exclusive particularity, 14 4. The fallacy of definition by initial predication, 15 5. The speculative dogma, 16 6. The error of verbal suggestion, 18 7. The fallacy of illicit importance, 19. O. THE REALISTIC PROGRAM OF REFORM 21 1. The scrupulous use of words, 21 2. Definition, 22 3. Analysis, 24 4. Regard for logical form, 26. 6. Division of the question, 26 6. Explicit agreement, 28 7. The separa tion of philosophical research from the study of the history of philosophy, 30. IV, REALISM AS A CONSTRUCTIVE PHILOSOPHY 31 1. Implications of the rejection of subjectivism, 32 2. Impli cations of the rejection of anti-intellectualism, 32 3. Monism and pluralism, 33 4. Knowledge and its object the independ ence of the object, 33 5. Identity of content and thing known, 34 6. Platonic realism, 35 7. Summary, 35. V. REALISM AND THE SPECIAL SCIENCES 36 1. The general attitude of realism to the special sciences, 86 2. Realism and psychology, 37 3. Realism and biology, 39 4. The relation of realism to logic and the mathematical sci ences, 40 5. Realism as a basis for cooperation, 41. THE EMANCIPATION OF METAPHYSICS FROM EPISTEMOLOGY BY WALTER T. MARVIN I. THE ISSUE BETWEEN DOGMATISM AND CRITICISM .... 45 1. Epistemology regarded as a science logically prior to all other sciences, 45 2. Epistemology regarded as a science of the limits vii viii and possibility of knowledge, 46 3. Epistemology regarded as a , j theory of reality, 474. Summary, 496. The propositions held by the dogmatist in opposition to criticism, 49 6. The con clusion which this essay will endeavor to establish, 60. II. THE THBOKY OF KNOWLEDGE NOT LOGICALLY FUNDAMENTAL . 61 1. Two errors suspected to be present in the argument of the criticist, 61 2. Logic is not a science of the laws of thought, 62 3. The subject matter of logic, 62 4. This subject matter is non-mental, 62 6. Logic is not the art of correct thinking, 63 6. The way in which we use logic in our thinking, 64 7. Sum mary, 66 8. Ambiguity of the word 4 knowledge the knowing process and the thing known, 66 9. The subsistence of proposi tions, 67 10. Conclusion, 60. HI...